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The Quality of Mercy 
Paul Rosenzweig* 
The quality of mercy is not strain’d, 
It droppeth as the gentle rain from heaven 
Upon the place beneath: it is twice blest; 
It blesseth him that gives and him that takes.1 
 
In recent years, the incidence of executive clemency for 
capital offenses has dropped dramatically.2 Why? Paul Larkin, in 
his article, The Demise of Capital Clemency,3 offers one very 
sensible explanation. Clemency, he argues, is less frequent 
precisely because the other mechanisms by which capital 
punishment is imposed have improved so much over the years in 
their capacity for differentiating between those truly deserving of 
capital punishment and those who are not.4 If one sees clemency, 
as Larkin does, as the ultimate error-correction mechanism,5 then 
                                                                                                     
 *  Professorial Lecturer in Law, George Washington University School of 
Law; Principal, Red Branch Consulting, PLLC. I thank my good friend Paul 
Larkin for the invitation to respond to his work. The fact that I have some 
questions and thoughts about his essay should not, in any way, detract from its 
significance. As should be clear, I find Larkin’s main point indisputable—it is 
only at the edges that I find myself suggesting the analysis needs greater 
amplification. 
 1.  WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act 4, sc. 1. 
 2.  See, e.g., William Alex Pridemore, An Empirical Examination of 
Commutations and Executions in Post-Furman Capital Cases, 17 JUST. Q. 159, 
161 fig.1 (2000) (comparing the number of executions to commutations and 
showing a sharp decline in the latter). 
 3.  73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1295 (2016). 
 4.  See id. at 1312–13 
The sentencing stage of capital prosecutions now eliminates almost 
all of the people who would have received clemency in days gone by. 
The small number of commutations seen today is a testament to that 
success and is an entirely logical result of the new capital sentencing 
rules adopted by the Supreme Court over the last forty years. 
 5.  See id. at 1337 (arguing that until the middle of the twentieth century, 
“the clemency process was the principal mechanism for correcting errors at the 
guilt or sentencing stages of a capital case”). 
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surely part of the explanation for why clemency is less frequent is 
that errors—of both law and justice—occur less often. 
Thus, according to Larkin, the assessment is that legislators 
have done a better job of more narrowly constraining the 
imposition of capital punishment to those who truly “deserve” it—
in some broader sense of justice—or at least to those who deserve 
it more than had been the case in earlier times.6 In this effort, the 
legislators have been assisted by the courts (most prominently 
the US Supreme Court) who have systematically excluded from 
the ambit of capital punishment classes of cases—those, for 
example, involving juveniles, or those where death does not 
result—that, by any measure, are less clear and less justified 
applications of the death penalty than the classes of cases that 
remain.7 
Likewise, under guidance from the courts, juries have been 
systematically provided with less discretion and greater guidance 
in the imposition of capital punishment.8 And this, in turn, has 
again narrowed the class of cases in which capital punishment is 
imposed to defendants who most people—at least among those 
who think that capital punishment is ever justified—would agree 
are more “worthy” of the ultimate sanction.9 
Perhaps more to the point, as Larkin points out, what is left 
of capital punishment continues to have the approval of citizens 
and legislators across the country—by a fair margin it seems.10 In 
that context, executive clemency seems less an exercise of error 
correction and is more frequently perceived as executive 
nullification of the people’s democratic choice. No elected official 
                                                                                                     
 6.  See id. at 1300–06 (discussing the evolution of capital punishment 
from the common law of the American colonies to the present). 
 7.  See id. at 1348–49 (noting that “the Supreme Court has placed out of 
bounds the execution of certain categories of offenders—the young, the mentally 
disabled, the less culpable”). 
 8.  See id. at 1348 (“Today, the capital sentencing process no longer leaves 
the decision whether a murderer should live or die to the unguided discretion of 
a jury or judge, who may not have heard relevant mitigating evidence.”).  
 9.  See id. at 1349 (arguing that modern sentencing procedures permit 
executions of “only those offenders most deserving of death”). 
 10.  See., e.g., Death Penalty, GALLUP, 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/1606/death-penalty.aspx (last visited Feb. 13, 2017) 
(showing that, in 2016, 60% of Americans polled favored the death penalty while 
only 37% opposed it) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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who wants ever to be re-elected is comfortable defying the will of 
the populace. And so, again, the structural changes in capital 
sentencing seem to be driving a reduction in the use of clemency 
by executive agents.11 
Larkin makes a powerful argument, one with a great deal of 
persuasive force, and one, I think, that goes a long way to 
describing much of what lies behind the reduction in executive 
clemency. But it is, in my view, incomplete. In focusing so 
exclusively on the behavioral explanations for clemency 
reduction, I wonder if Larkin is, perhaps, missing a part of the 
puzzle—namely that there is a non-systemic moral component to 
the criminal law (and to capital punishment in particular) that 
his exposition does not fully take into account. Put another way, 
we seem to be in the process of sorting the American populace 
based upon attitudes toward capital punishment, and that might 
also explain partially the decline in executive clemency. 
To explain what I mean, let me start with a personal 
reflection from my time as a law clerk at the US Court of Appeals 
for the Eleventh Circuit. Based in Atlanta, the Eleventh Circuit 
covers the geographic area of Georgia, Florida, and Alabama—all 
states that impose capital penalties on various offenders.12 As a 
consequence, the judges of the Circuit spent an inordinate 
amount of time processing federal habeas corpus appeals from 
capital cases in those States. Though by volume the number of 
such cases could not have exceeded 5% of the docket (at least so 
my memory says) they seemed, anecdotally at least, to require 
25% of the judges’ time (and, as a result, a similar fraction of the 
time of the judges’ law clerks). There were, of course, initial 
habeas appeals—often massive filings alleging dozens, if not 
hundreds, of errors in a lengthy State trial record and appellate 
proceeding. And then, even more daunting, there were the 
emergency appeals—equally voluminous, and all filed on the cusp 
of execution, where decisions by the court were made in a matter 
                                                                                                     
 11.  See Larkin, supra note 3, at 1338 (explaining that clemency has 
declined because “[l]ocal juries and judges have already filtered out those 
offenders to whom governors would have historically granted a commutation”). 
 12.  States With and Without the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty (last updated Nov. 
9, 2016) (last visited Feb. 13, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 609 (2017) 612 
of hours, rather than at the leisurely pace that attended most of 
the court’s actions. 
The cases were all extremely painful and heart-rending. 
There was always a victim—some innocent whose life had been 
snuffed out by criminal violence, leaving behind grieving family 
and friends who had suffered a tragic, almost arbitrary loss. 
Likewise, there was the perpetrator—now a convicted felon, often 
with no visibly redeeming qualities but who, with the help of his 
lawyers, was now presenting evidence of his own humanity, often 
by illuminating past circumstances of his life. This evidence was 
not offered to justify his crime, mind you, but rather was a kind of 
indirect appeal for the exercise of judicial clemency. His troubled 
childhood, mental illness, sexual abuse, and/or limited 
intelligence had already been presented to a jury and found 
wanting; yet, the appeal asked the court to revisit that weighing 
and reset the scales of justice. 
Judicial clemency, however, was rare. The jurists of the court 
were rather inured to the appeal process and focused instead on 
the legal requirements—exercising the gate keeping function that 
Larkin has so ably described13 while putting aside (for the most 
part) their own personal feelings. But that did not mean that 
their sense of just deserts was always satisfied—I suspect it was 
not. Or, more accurately, I can say that for at least one law clerk 
(me) it was not. 
One case in particular, the case of Marvin Edward Johnson,14 
sticks with me as an example of a situation in which the sorting 
functions that Larkin touts seem to have failed. Johnson was no 
angel—he had a lengthy criminal record and on the day in 
question was engaged in the armed robbery of a convenience 
store, hardly conduct that would engage our sympathies. But 
there were sympathies nonetheless. Johnson had completed the 
robbery and was leaving the store, with everyone in it unharmed, 
when the pharmacist pulled a gun from under the counter and 
shot Johnson. Johnson, wounded and no doubt angry, exchanged 
gunfire and shot the pharmacist, killing him instantly. 
                                                                                                     
 13.  See Larkin, supra note 3, at 1338 (observing that “state appellate 
courts review the conviction and sentence” of defendants sentenced to death). 
 14.  For those interested, the case is Johnson v. Wainwright, 806 F.2d 1479 
(11th Cir. 1986). 
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For my money, Johnson had a colorable (perhaps even 
compelling) case for avoiding the imposition of capital 
punishment. He had been leaving the store; he had not acted with 
malice aforethought; and the death of the pharmacist was the 
result of Johnson’s own reaction to being shot. Indeed, the 
pharmacist had (according to eye witnesses) emptied his gun 
firing at Johnson, who then killed the now-defenseless 
pharmacist. These mitigating factors were precisely the sort that, 
had I been on the jury, would have motivated me to opt for a 
sentence of life imprisonment rather than death. 
And yet, on review, it seemed as though all of the proper 
substantive and procedural requirements for the imposition of 
capital punishment had been met. The Florida jury that convicted 
Johnson had heard the mitigating circumstances but 
nevertheless chose to impose the death penalty. Despite my 
misgivings (I cannot, and would never, speak for the judge I 
clerked for), Johnson’s capital sentence was duly affirmed and he 
died while awaiting execution in death row.15 
Therein, I think, lies the gap in Larkin’s analysis: he sees the 
capital punishment system as a system. It operates, for Larkin, at 
the level of collective incentives and systematic preferences. And, 
to be sure, that is true—but it is only a partial truth. The other 
portion of the truth is that capital punishment is an intensely 
individual question, one that engages a person’s moral faculties 
in ways that are surely unique. It asks each of us, individually 
and collectively, about our sense of the quality of justice (Larkin’s 
focus) and also the quality of mercy. 
So, where I take issue with Larkin’s analysis (to the limited 
extent I take issue) is with his supposition that the “system” is 
itself sufficient to address the clemency-worthy cases.16 As he 
puts it, “[b]y the time that a condemned prisoner has run out of 
legal challenges to his sentence and applies for clemency, the 
                                                                                                     
 15.  Press Release, Fla. Dep’t of Corrections, Death Row Inmate Dies of 
Natural Causes (Nov. 22, 1999) (on file with author), 
http://www.dc.state.fl.us/secretary/press/1999/drdeath.html. 
 16.  See generally Larkin, supra note 3 (arguing that the modern American 
death penalty system excludes those death sentences that, in the past, would 
have been eliminated through clemency). 
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chances are virtually nil that the death penalty is an unduly 
severe or inappropriate penalty for him.”17 
That characterization is only true if we think that nothing 
but the systemic questions to which the legal process is addressed 
are the only ones that bear on the question of clemency. As the 
example of Mr. Johnson makes clear,18 I think that theory 
overstates the case. There remains (and always will remain) a 
zone or ambit of moral faculty—what I call the question of 
mercy—that is outside the bounds of the system. 
The best contemporary example that I know of this 
dichotomy, one which tends to support Larkin’s main point, is the 
story of former Virginia governor Tim Kaine, who is now a 
Senator and, recently, was a candidate for Vice President of the 
United States.19 Kaine is, quite famously, a Catholic with strong 
moral principles against the imposition of the death penalty.20 
But Virginia was, at the time of his gubernatorial term at least, a 
State where the populace strongly backed the imposition of 
capital punishment.21 As Kaine was running for election, he was 
challenged about how he would square his personal views with 
the laws of Virginia. 
His response was unequivocal—he would follow the law as 
written and decline to exercise executive clemency in a way that 
frustrated the will of the populace.22 And, by all accounts, Kaine 
                                                                                                     
 17.  Id. at 1338 (emphasis added). 
 18.  See supra note 14 and accompanying text (recounting my experience 
with Mr. Johnson and his death penalty case).  
 19.  See generally Tim Kaine Biography, BIO, 
http://www.biography.com/people/tim-kaine-338982 (last updated Nov. 9, 2016) 
(last visited Feb. 14, 2017) (providing information about Tim Kaine) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 20.  See id. (noting Kaine’s Catholic beliefs and that he “was deeply 
opposed to the death penalty”). 
 21.  See, e.g., Jennifer Agiesta, On Eve of Execution, Virginians Broadly 
Support Penalty, WASH. POST (Nov. 9, 2009), 
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/behind-the-
numbers/2009/11/on_eve_of_execution_virginians.html (last visited Feb. 14, 
2017) (“Virginia voters favor the death penalty by a better than 2 to 1 margin, 
with 66 percent supportive of it, 31 percent opposed. And intensity on this issue 
is with the supporters: 45 percent ‘strongly’ back capital punishment, 18 percent 
are that solidly opposed.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 22.  Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Thomas Kaplan, On Death Penalty Cases, Tim 
Kaine Revealed Inner Conflict, N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/24/us/politics/tim-kaine-death-
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was true to his word; during his term, he rejected several 
clemency petitions that his religious principles would have called 
for him to accept.23 But the mere fact that he was obliged to do 
so—and that we can also imagine Kaine having taken the 
opposite tack—suggests that the non-systemic values have a 
continuing and important role in the clemency determination. 
To explore this further, imagine the counter-factual: that 
Kaine did not exclude faith from his decision-making and, indeed, 
made clear that he could not do so and remain true to himself. 
Imagine if he had instead said, “Here I am, take all of me or 
none.” And imagine further that he had won election anyway, 
notwithstanding his opposition to the death penalty in all forms. 
What, then, could we say about clemency in Virginia? 
Well, in the first instance, it would have given us an 
executive who favored clemency even when the processes of 
capital punishment had operated appropriately. That, in turn, 
would suggest that Larkin’s assessment is incomplete. 
But the thought experiment also exposes another way in 
which I think that Larkin’s analysis is not as nuanced as the real 
world might be, for he imagines a system in which societal 
preferences are well-expressed and easily discerned. That, after 
all, is why Larkin thinks that the executives act as they do—they 
fear, for example, political retribution, and they are comfortable 
with delegating in effect their clemency authority to the jury and 
the judges reviewing the case.24 
Put another way, Larkin supposes a world in which the 
citizenry’s exogenous preferences regarding capital punishment 
are well-enough known that they can be readily discerned and, 
having been discerned, acted upon by elected representatives. My 
Kaine hypothetical challenges that supposition by positing a case 
in which the electoral body sends mixed messages—both electing 
                                                                                                     
penalty.html?_r=0 (last visited Feb. 14, 2017) (“He cast his decisions in simple 
terms: As Virginia’s governor, he was sworn to uphold the law — a message that 
helped him get elected governor.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 23.  See id. (noting that despite his opposition to the death penalty, “Mr. 
Kaine presided over 11 executions as governor, delaying some but granting 
clemency only once”). 
 24.  See Larkin, supra note 3, at 1308 (“Fearing the electorate’s political 
wrath, governors have refused to commute death sentences, particularly in 
election years.”). 
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a legislature that adopts capital punishment and an executive 
who is opposed to it. How to resolve this conflict? And, more 
importantly, what does the fact of uncertainty say about Larkin’s 
premise? There is, it seems to me, ample room for a vision of 
capital punishment that is not as monolithic as Larkin suggests it 
might be. 
Let me make one final point in this short essay before 
closing, one that relates to the allocation of authority and 
responsibility for the imposition of capital sentences. As Larkin 
accurately notes, the evidence regarding the deterrent effect of 
capital punishment is hotly disputed and the subject of much 
analysis.25 I think that the evidence mostly supports the idea that 
capital punishment has a deterrent effect. That, after all, is 
consistent with our broader sense of criminal law and deterrence. 
Where I part ways from Larkin, however, is in his conclusion 
that the disputed efficacy of capital punishment suggests that the 
proper place for resolving the question is “in the legislatures and 
at the ballot box.”26 Why should this be the case? 
In the first instance, as I’ve already noted, the resolution 
from the ballot box may be ambiguous or indeterminate. It may 
conflict, in some instances, with the views of the legislature (if 
only because some rent-seeking group has captured the 
legislature). 
In the second instance, there is no reason that I know of to 
suppose that the legislature is a priori better at resolving these 
efficacy questions than the executive. To be sure, there is some 
sense in which the legislature is more representative of popular 
opinion—but one premise of the modern state is actually that we 
should defer to executive determinations of disputed factual 
questions, rather than legislative ones.27 You don’t need to pick 
                                                                                                     
 25.  See id. at 1326–27 (“Some economists and sociologists have conducted 
regression analyses of the available data and have concluded that capital 
punishment has a measurable deterrent advantage over life 
imprisonment. . . . Other scholars, however, doubt that conclusion.”). 
 26.  Id. at 1328. 
 27.  One example of this is the Chevron doctrine of deference to agency 
rulemaking. See, e.g., Edward J. Imwinkelried, Defeating Deference: A 
Practitioner’s Guide to Overcoming the Chevron Doctrine, 31 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 
69, 69 (2007) (“The Chevron Doctrine gives administrative agencies almost 
unbridled discretion to form statutory interpretations of legislative intent. More 
often than not, the interpreting agency receives heightened, if not, mandatory 
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sides in the contest, however, to recognize that it is, in fact, a 
contest and there is (or ought to be) nothing wrong with an 
executive substituting his or her considered judgement as to 
efficacy for that of the legislature’s discretion. 
A governor might, for example, think that the potential for 
clemency would induce to a criminal to put down his or her arms 
and surrender in a situation where, in the absence of clemency, 
the criminal might choose to “shoot it out” rather than surrender 
and face death anyway.  
This assessment is not nonsensical—before the International 
Criminal Court was created, there were many who argued that a 
far better way to improve the real-world, on the ground situation 
in countries ruled by despots was to offer them a way out—
retirement, say, in some foreign land with impunity from 
prosecution.28 The idea, of course, was that when faced with 
criminal prosecution, an autocrat would hunker down in place 
and refuse to leave. It was said then (and I agree) that the 
availability of forgiveness, or mercy, was sometimes an incentive 
to the end of strife. That isn’t necessarily an accurate judgment, 
but I can readily imagine an executive who publicly says that he 
will exercise clemency in those sorts of capital punishment cases 
as an incentive to early surrender. That might be a sentiment 
contrary to the lessons of the legislature or the ballot box. 
And so, in the end, one of the lessons we learn from 
Shakespeare (or so it seems to me) is that mercy is a quality that 
we should value highly and value most highly of all in the 
powerful. The greater the authority wielded, the greater the 
necessity of humility and the capacity for forgiveness. That, in 
the end, is where I part ways with Larkn. Not in any 
disagreement with his analysis, but rather in his implicit 
acceptance of the system as designed. Yes, indeed, our 
                                                                                                     
deference for its interpretation.”). 
 28.  See, e.g., KENNETH A. RODMAN, THE ICC AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: 





the-Interests-of-Peace.pdf (noting that “the leaders of abusive regimes and rebel 
movements are often granted formal amnesties or asylum abroad in order to 
facilitate bargaining and advance reconciliation”). 
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restructuring of the capital punishment process narrows the 
ambit within which executive clemency can be exercised. But in 
the end, a structure that Larkin sees as a supporting edifice 
holding up the architecture of clemency is one that, to me, is also 
sometimes a crutch used by those who are unwilling to engage in 
hard moral choices as a way of avoiding responsibility. On its own 
terms, the structure is a wild success; as an exercise in moral 
accountability, I rate it less highly. 
 
